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ABSTRACT 
We develop a partial equilibrium job search model to analyse wage mobility and its relation to job 
mobility. The basic job search model is generalized by introducing wage renegotiation at the firm 
level and on-the-job search. Besides we model the value of leisure as a function of the previous 
wage. We present a semi-structural estimation using data on employment and wages for men 20 to 
60 years old from the European Community Household Panel (Spain, Germany, France and 
Portugal). The estimated parameters from the model are then used to identify the sources of the 
wage loss associated with unemployment. German and Spanish workers tend to suffer larger wage 
penalties than their French and Portuguese counterparts. Wage losses in Germany are mainly 
related to better wage opportunities when employed.  In Spain wage losses tend to remain longer
since on the job wage growth is lower. We also evaluate the effect of the Unemployment Benefit 
system on wage changes after unemployment and find that a sole level for unemployment benefits 
(dependent on the national average wage level) reduces wage penalties for all workers with the 
exception of the highly educated. 
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The empirical evidence demonstrates that some unemployed workers may be willing to accept wage 
cuts after unemployment (Farber, 1997; Rosolia and Saint Paul, 1998; Gregory and Jukes, 1997; Ahn 
and García-Perez, 2002; Lefranc, 2003; García Pérez and Rebollo, 2005). It has traditionally been 
argued that these wage cuts after unemployment could be related to reservation wage strategies guided 
by low unemployment benefits or due to the depreciation of general and specific human capital skills 
during the unemployment spell. However, reservation wage strategies are also related to expected 
wages while employed. That is, the worker might accept a wage cut because he expects that being 
employed increases the probability of access to better-paid jobs.  
However, the literature related to the study of wage changes after unemployment is of an eminently 
empirical character and the majority of studies usually estimate reduced-form wage equations. The 
main shortcoming of this approach is that it reveals no information about the structural process 
underlying the observed behaviour. In the present paper we try to overcome the limits imposed by a 
reduced-form estimation process. Thus, we develop a partial equilibrium job search model and apply a 
semi-structural approach. That is, we take into account the complete set of restrictions imposed by the 
theory. The main advantage of this approach is that the econometric specification is fully consistent 
with the underlying theoretical framework. Thus, it becomes possible to study parameters such as the 
value of time or the probability of receiving job offers while unemployed not otherwise present in the 
econometric specification of wage equations. Besides, the information derived from the structural 
estimation of the model not only describes the probability and magnitude of wage changes but its 
relation to job mobility. For instance, it is possible that although the change in real wages is not very 
different among certain workers, the sources of this change may be different: in some cases wage 
changes may be related to low offered wages or low job offer probability while unemployed, whereas 
in others they may be related to high future wages while employed. As we will show afterwards, to 
identify the source of the wage loss it is relevant to value the potential persistence of the observed 
wage loss.  
Various attempts have been made to structurally estimate job search model parameters. One important 
example that directly relates job and wage mobility is Jovilet, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2004). In this 
paper a job search model is structurally estimated to analyse job turnover in different European 
countries. In order to identify job turnover parameters they make two main assumptions. Firstly, they 
assume that the unemployed income flow is low enough for all job offers to be accepted by the 
unemployed and, therefore the unemployment exit probability equals the probability of receiving job 
offers. Additionally, they assume that the only way to scale up in the wage distribution is through 
changing jobs. With these assumptions, the acceptance behaviour of unemployed workers does not 
depend on expectations related to on-the-job wage growth. 
Since we are interested in measuring the role of future wage expectations on the job acceptance 
behaviour of unemployed workers, our model must simultaneously encompass the different sources of 
wage changes while employed. Therefore, we model the job search process of the unemployed and 








allow for on-the-job search and on-the-job wage growth. These two assumptions increase the expected 
return from accepting an offer and consequently increase the probability of observing negative wage 
changes after unemployment. Finally, we also assume that the value of time while unemployed is 
related to the previous wage through the dependence of unemployment benefits to this wage. Thus, the 
higher the previous wage, the higher the reservation wage and the re-employment wage and thus, the 
lower the expected wage cut after unemployment. These modifications of the basic search model 
provide a more realistic picture of the incentives that unemployed workers face in their search process 
and make the present model original with respect to the existing literature on job search. 
The main theoretical result of our model is that re-employment wages are closely related to reservation 
wage strategies and, subsequently, to labour dynamics while unemployed and employed. The model 
suggests that unemployed workers expecting that the accepted job is a stepping-stone to better jobs 
and/or higher wages will tend to have lower reservation wages when unemployed and a higher 
probability of experiencing wage losses after unemployment. This wage loss will not be permanent, as 
the individual tends to experience wage growth while employed. Moreover, individuals will also have 
lower reservation wages when their value of time while unemployed is low. This increases the 
probability of observing wage losses, which can be permanent if the expected wage change while 
employed is also low. Hence, with our model we can identify permanent and transitory wage cuts after 
unemployment and the main sources for these two different wage cuts.  
In the empirical part of the paper we present a semi-structural estimation of the model using data on 
spells of employment and unemployment and wages for men 20 to 60 years old from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). We focus the analysis on Spain, France, Portugal and 
Geramny
1. We divide each national sample into three groups depending on the education level of the 
worker, since labour market conditions for each group may differ. One novelty of the paper rests on 
using the reservation wage data available in the ECHP to identify model´s parameters. 
Our results indicate that the model is remarkably good at reflecting wage distributions and average 
wage changes. The main findings of the paper are the following. Firstly, we find that worker´s 
reservation wage while unemployed to previous wage ratio is a good indicator of the magnitude of the 
wage penalty. For instance, Germany and Spain have the lowest ratio and the highest wage losses 
associated with unemployment among the four countries. Secondly, on average terms, wage losses are 
larger for workers with a lower level of studies because they adjust their reservation wages more than 
workers with higher skills. The main source of this adjustment comes from the lower value of time 
while unemployed and, since they are not related to better wage expectations while employed, these 
wage losses also tend to be more permanent. Thirdly, when we compare wage losses among countries 
we find that they are larger in Germany and Spain than in France and Portugal. We find that the value 
of time while unemployed, relative to the worker’s previous wage, is not higher for countries with 
high unemployment rates, such as Spain. The sources of the larger wage loss in Germany and Spain 
are quite different: wage losses in Germany are larger than in Spain and are mainly related to better 
                                                           
1 Initially our goal was to analyse all the countries present in the ECHP but we had to omit small countries such as Belgium 
and Denmark because their sample size are not large enough, along with countries where the available data on wages was 








wage opportunities once employed. On the contrary, wage losses in Spain are lower but tend to remain 
longer since wage growth while employed and job stability is lower in this country. We find evidence 
of the scarring effect of unemployment given that job offers for the unemployed are negatively related 
to previous spells of unemployment.  
We also use the estimated parameters to evaluate alternative policy interventions for unemployed 
workers. We show that different reforms of the Unemployment Insurance (UI) Benefit system may 
have different effects on workers’ reservation wage strategies and therefore on wage changes after 
unemployment. For example, a sole level for unemployment benefits (dependent on the national 
average wage level) reduces wage penalties for all workers except for the highly educated. 
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 introduces the job search model and Section 3 
describes the likelihood function used for the structural estimation. Section 4 describes the data used 
while Section 5 presents our main results. Section 6 presents the results of some policy evaluation 
exercises and, finally, the main conclusions are reported in Section 7. 
2 The  Model 
The model is an extension of the classical search model of Burdett (1978) with search on the job
2.The 
additions to the basic structure are the following. While employed, the worker can receive offers from 
the current job as well as from outside jobs. Also, the non-labor income depends on the worker´s 
previous wage. With these two assumptions we obtain different wage distribution functions depending 
on the type of job mobility experienced by the worker. 
The rest of the model is standard. Agents are assumed to maximize expected discounted earnings over 
an infinite time horizon. They can be both working and receiving a wage that may increase while 
employed or unemployed and looking for a job. The expected value of being unemployed depends on 
the value of time while unemployed and on the expected future income from employment. The value 
of time while unemployed, B, depends on non-labour income, mainly unemployment benefits.
3 
Moreover, we assume that unemployment benefits are a function of the previous wage.
4  
Job offers are fully described by wages. Within each period, an unemployed worker receives job offers 
with probability λu. While employed, the worker receives job offers from other firms (outside offers, 
hereafter) with probability λe. Additionally, the worker may continue employed at the current firm but 
with a new wage. In this case we assume that the worker has received an offer of wage negotiation
5 
                                                           
2 See Mortensen (1986) for a review of this vast literature.  
3 However, in order to maintain the tractability of the model, we are going to assume that this dependence is not considered 
by the worker when taking into account future unemployment spells. In García-Pérez & Rebollo (2006) we relax this 
assumption what makes the model highly non-stationary. 
4 It is well known that in many European countries unemployment benefits are a function of previous wages (see OECD, 
2000). 
5 This setup does not permit modelling wage renegotiation explicitly because the firms play a passive role in the model. The 
idea behind the inside offers is that employed workers may renegotiate their wages to account for changes in their 








(inside offers, hereafter) from the current firm
6 and λe
’ represents the probability of receiving such 
offers. Once the inside offer is received the worker will accept it if the expected value of staying at the 
current job with the new offered wage is higher than the value of rejecting the offer and entering into 
unemployment. Therefore, in the present model we assume that a transition from employment to 
unemployment consists of receiving an inside offer lower than the worker’s reservation wage. We 
assume that the offer probability is higher for unemployed than for employed individuals
7. Offered 
wages are random drawings from distributions with cumulative distribution functions F(⋅ ) for the 
unemployed, G(⋅ ) for outside offers and H(⋅⏐w0 ) for inside offers, respectively. Moreover, inside 
offers are assumed to be conditional on the current wage, w 0 .
8 It is also assumed that G( ⋅ ) and 
H(⋅⏐w0) stochastically dominate F(⋅ ).  
This is the general framework of the model from which we derive the basic equations describing the 
worker’s optimal policy. Consider first an unemployed worker who receives a job offer with 
probability λu and has to decide whether to accept it and forego the possibility of finding a better job 
or to continue searching in the hope of obtaining a better offer in the future. This scenario is expressed 
by the value function Vu defined as follows:  










              (1) 
where Ve(x) describes the value of being employed at wage x and r is the interest rate used to compute 
the discount factor. The value function  u V  represents the present value of the sum of the opportunity 
cost of accepting the job offer and the option value of searching again next period. If the unemployed 
worker receives a wage offer, he compares the value of the offer with the value of continuing to search 
for a better one. On the contrary, he obtains the value of continued unemployment. This option value 
covers the possibility that the worker might eventually obtain a better wage offer in the future.  
The expected value of being employed at wage w is the sum of the current wage and the discounted 
expected value of future events weighted by their respective probabilities: 
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The terms in brackets detail the various components of the job value within the next period. Firstly, 
when the individual receives an outside offer he compares its expected value with the current wage. 
Secondly, if he receives an inside offer he compares the expected value of accepting that offer with the 
current wage and the value of entering again into unemployment. Thirdly, he can remain in the same 
                                                           
6 The reader must note that we do not allow for counter-offers/renegotiation of contracts should a worker receive an outside 
offer, as in Cahuc et al  (2003). For example, we could assume that outside offers are not observable by firms, in which case 
an employer is unable to respond to any of such offers.  
7 In job search models it is common to assume higher search intensity  on the part of the unemployed. In Rendon (2001) we 
can find an empirical test of this hypothesis, which will also be tested in our structural estimation. 
8 A positive cross-section association between the wage and the length of the job is a common observation reported in the 
empirical literature. When we make inside wage offers conditional on  current wages we are trying to reflect this empirical 








state if he does not receive any of these offers. Equation   (2) states that when the worker compares the 
value of the job with the value of continuing the job search, he considers the expected flow of income 
from employment, which depends on the expected income from searching while employed and the 
expected income from staying in the same job. We also derive from equation   (2) that the value of 
being employed is lower when jobs do not last forever but higher when there is on-the-job wage 
growth and on-the-job search. 
Workers optimise given expectations of future events. Once a relationship is established between the 
two potential labour force states, the optimal behaviour is represented by worker’s reservation wages
9. 
An unemployed worker who receives an offer x chooses between values Vu and Ve(x) and accepts the 
offer if and only if Vu <Ve(x). Thus, an optimal policy for unemployed workers is derived from the 
equality condition:  
(3)  ( ) ue r VV w =                       (3) 
Using this condition and evaluating equation   (2) at the reservation wage, wr, we obtain the following 
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The left hand side in equation   (4) describes the present net marginal return of accepting the job offer at 
the reservation wage. The right hand side of equation   (4) may be interpreted as the expected net 
marginal return of continuing to search in the event of receiving an offer equal to the reservation wage. 
It represents the present value of the expected capital gain attributable to finding an acceptable wage 
offer next period minus the expected capital gain attributable to accepting the job offer associated with 
a wage equal to the reservation wage. This last expected capital gain is related to expected returns 
from on-the-job search and on-the job wage growth. The higher these expected returns, the lower the 
reservation wage. All these expectations are discounted by the interest rate and the probability of 
inside and outside wage offers
10.   
In this model, unemployed workers decide to accept the job offer by taking into account the expected 
value of future wages. For instance, higher values of λe
’ or λe make the worker more willing to accept 
a low initial wage in exchange for a steeper wage profile over time. Thus, depending on the value of 
                                                           
9 It may be argued that job mobility and acceptance behaviour of individuals depend on the value of a job and this value is 
not completely characterised by wages. Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2003) estimate a job search model and test whether 
unobserved heterogeneity on the value of jobs is relevant to describe job mobility decisions. They estimate the model using 
the ECHP for 10 European countries and conclude that job mobility decisions are indeed based on simple wage comparisons.  
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The left hand side represents the payoff of accepting the current offer at the reservation wage and the right hand side is the 








the structural parameters, it will be optimal for the worker to accept low wage job offers and to exit 
rapidly from unemployment or to accept only high wage offers and consequently to stay unemployed 
longer.  
In the basic version of the model (Mortensen, 1986), offered wages are assumed to be independent of 
the labour status of the worker. In this case, the effects of the interest rate, the turnover rate and the 
pattern of the wage offer distribution on the reservation wage depend critically on the difference 
between job offers probabilities while employed and unemployed. For example, given an 
improvement in the job offer distribution function, the reservation wage increases if the job offer 
probability when unemployed exceeds that when employed, because in such case the search while 
unemployed is more efficient. These results hold in our model but we add the possibility that wage 
offers also depend on the labour state of the worker. In our model the desirability of searching while 
unemployed depends on the difference between job offer probabilities but also on the difference 
between expected wages associated with job offers. This implies that the reservation wage in our 
model may be lower than the reservation wage in Mortensen (1986), because the individual also 
considers the case that expected wage offers can be higher while employed. 
Finally, as we will see afterwards, our data indicate that some job-to-job transitions imply real wage 
cuts. In order to improve the performance of the model to explain real data, we add this possibility to 
our model. This fact can be represented by a situation where the worker receives a non-acceptable 
inside offer and an acceptable outside job offer simultaneously. When we add this possibility to our 
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Several insights can be derived from the present model regarding the determinants of wage mobility 
and its relation to job mobility. Firstly, we obtain that the expected re-employment wage depend on 
reservation wages and, therefore, on all the model’s parameters. We compute the wage change after 
unemployment as being the difference between the wage earned in the previous job and the estimated 
re-employment wage. Therefore, by estimating the model’s structural parameters, we can determine 
the different sources of wage changes after unemployment. To compute accepted wages for voluntary 
job movers we have to remember that the model describes two cases: workers who experience a wage 
gain and those who have a wage cut. Therefore, the way the accepted wage is defined depends on the 
sign of the wage change experienced. In the absence of a negative inside offer, the optimal strategy for 
an employed individual is to accept any inside offer that exceeds his current wage  
If the worker simultaneously receives a non-acceptable inside offer and an outside job offer higher 
than his reservation wage, then he will experience a job-to-job transition. In this situation the 








In our model we also consider the case in which workers experience wage changes in their current job. 
In this case, the worker’s optimal strategy is to accept any inside offer, ws , with a wage higher than 
his reservation wage, even though this could imply a wage cut. Comparing the previous wage with the 
expected accepted wage when employed we can relate wage mobility to voluntary job mobility 
decisions and job stability. As in the case of unemployed workers, the job mobility decisions of 
employed workers depend on their reservation wage strategy.  
Summing up, in our model we have two main sources of high reservation wages and only one can be 
directly related to the traditional approach of real wage rigidity. On the one hand, in terms of our 
model, the argument of real wage rigidity would imply that the value of time while unemployed 
relative to the previous wage should be higher in countries with larger average wage changes and 
larger unemployment spells. However, on the other hand, from our model we also know that a higher 
reservation wage might be the rational outcome of low wage growth expectations while employed and 
a high probability of exiting again to unemployment. If this is the case, labour policies aimed at 
reducing the value of time while unemployed by reducing Unemployment Benefits might not be the 
best means of reducing unemployment levels. In the following analysis we will attempt to disentangle 
the sources of the differences in the reservation wage observed among workers of different countries 
and educational levels. 
3  The Likelihood Function 
The job search model proposed above is estimated using data regarding the duration of employment 
and unemployment spells and monthly wages for a sample of European workers. The empirical 
estimation strategy follows directly from our theoretical model. In order to recover the parameters of 
the model, we impose all the restrictions it implies in the likelihood function.  
  Our observations identify two main types of worker states: i) Employed workers who are either 
stayers, that is, workers without a job change along a year, or job movers without an unemployment 
spell between two consecutive jobs; and ii) workers with an intermediate period of unemployment 
between two jobs. Hence, the likelihood function in our estimation procedure contains these two main 
states:  
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where the index j represents the individual, lu represents the likelihood contribution of workers with 
unemployment spells (indexed by u); wju1 and wju0 are the current and previous wage respectively and 
Tju is the duration of the unemployment spell. Additionally, to guarantee the identification of the 
model’s parameters, we use data regarding the worker’s self-reported reservation wage w r –in the 
following section we will describe this variable in more detail. The term le describes the contribution 
of employed individuals (indexed by e). The information available for this group is basically job 








From now on we omit individual indexes to simplify the notation The term lu is specified as in Wolpin 
(1987) and García-Perez (2006).: 
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Where αu is a dummy variable equal to one for completed unemployment spells and βu is an indicator 
of individuals with known accepted wages. The first bracket shows the likelihood contribution of 
uncensored unemployment spells while the second bracket corresponds to those who were still 
unemployed at the time of the interview
11. We also distinguish between completed spells depending on 
whether the accepted wage is known
12.  
The likelihood contribution of employment spells is determined from information regarding the job 
length and the wage earned according to the following expression:  
(8) 
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where αe is equal to one if the individual changes job and zero otherwise, βe’ is equal to one if he 
experiences on-the-job wage change, and βe is equal to one when he experiences job-to-job transitions 
associated with a wage gain. These two variables are equal to zero in the corresponding opposite case. 
Te represents observed job tenure
13; ws1 represents the current wage for stayers with on-the-job wage 
change, wm1 represents the accepted wage for job movers with wage gains and wl1 the accepted wage 
for job movers associated to wage losses. The first term in equation   (8) describes the likelihood 
contribution for individuals that stay in the same job and either experience a wage change (first 
bracket) or not (second bracket), and the second term shows the likelihood contribution for individuals 
that move to a new job.  
Given this likelihood function, and taking into account the reservation wage, expressed in equation 
  (5), we can estimate the structural parameters of the model provided they are all identified. 
3.1  Some Comments on Identification 
Our data basically consists of wages, unemployment and employment spell durations and information 
regarding transitions. Traditionally, the joint observation of wage and worker mobility data implies 
over-identification of the model’s transition parameters. However, in the context of this model we do 
not have over-identification when we study employed workers. For instance, in the case of job-to-job 
transitions, to identify whether the worker experiences a wage cut or a wage gain, both individual 
                                                           
11 This type of individual is also relevant in the estimation. If they are still unemployed it is perhaps due to their reservation 
wage decisions. If we do not consider them we could bias the estimated wage losses.  
12 This is due to the characteristics of the data. In Section   4 we explain how we obtain the information on previous and 
current wages.  








transitions and wage data are needed. From accepted wages of unemployed workers we can identify 
the wage offer distribution truncated at the reservation wage F(wu1/wu>wr). Flinn and Heckman (1982) 
showed that unless one imposes certain distributional assumptions on F(.), the tail below the 
reservation wage cannot be identified without information on wages associated with rejected job 
offers. This identification problem also arises in the case of outside and inside wage offer 
distributions. Therefore, as we describe in the Appendix I, we have imposed certain distributional 
assumptions regarding F(⋅ ), G(⋅ ) and H(⋅⏐w0 ). Besides, we also impose the assumption that both 
inside and outside offer distributions stochastically dominate the offer distribution for the unemployed. 
The probability of existing from unemployment can be identified from the moment the individual 
starts working. As we have observations for accepted inside and outside offers the same applies to the 
probability of accepting inside and outside job offers. 
Finally, we have also used the self-reported reservation wage data provided by the ECHP to guarantee 
identification of the remaining parameters. We assume that the self-reported reservation wage is a 
random variable that follows a lognormal distribution: 
(9) 
oe
rr r Lnw Lnw π ε =+                   (9) 
where 
o
r w is the self-reported reservation wage, εr is a random error term, 
e
r w  is the estimated 
reservation wage derived from the optimal strategy of the unemployed worker solved from the model, 
and π measures how far the self-reported reservation wage diverges from the estimated one. If π is 
positive, then the estimated reservation wage will be lower than the declared one. To identify this 
parameter we use completed spells of unemployment and we compare the accepted wage with the 
reservation wage declared by the worker at the moment of the interview. Since one would expect the 
reservation wage to be equal to or lower than the accepted wage, this comparison offers us an indicator 
of the reliability of self-reported reservation wages
14. 
4  The Data and Some Empirical Facts 
The data set we use in this study is the European Community Household Panel, ECHP. We have used 
eight waves from 1994 to 2001. This survey is the most appropriate one for our purposes because it 
offers homogeneous information for the different European economies we want to study. Moreover, it 
offers wide-ranging labour market information which includes variables describing the behaviour of 
individuals during unemployment and employment spells, thereby allowing us to identify certain 
fundamental parameters. For instance, at the moment of the interview the individual is asked which 
wage would make him willing to accept a job offer. This variable can be considered as a proxy for the 
reservation wage concept and we therefore use it to better identify the parameters of our structural 
model. 
                                                           
14 This divergence might also be interpreted in another way. Interviewees are also asked how many hours per month they 
would be willing to work with the reported reservation wage. Ideally, we should compute the hourly reservation wage and 
compare it with the accepted hourly- wage. Unfortunately the consideration of working hours restricts our sample size too 
much. Thus, the observed divergences between the current wage and the reported reservation wage may be due to the fact 








The ECHP is based on a survey carried out annually on a sample of households. This sample is 
selected for each country considered in the database. It has a panel dimension, thereby enabling the 
history of individuals to be followed during the period of the survey. Various personal, labour and 
economic information is obtained regarding each individual, together with certain characteristics of 
the household. Most of the variables describe the situation at the moment of the interview. However, 
some variables, such as individual and household earnings, refer to the situation during the year prior 
to the interview.   
Individual labour history is available through a retrospective report of the monthly labour status. The 
duration of unemployment used in this paper is obtained from this monthly description of the labour 
situation of individuals. We combine the monthly labour situation and the data on annual earnings to 
calculate the monthly income and, in particular, the monthly wage. If the individual has one 
employment spell during the year, the monthly wage is the ratio between the number of months in 
employment and the annual labour earnings
15. If the individual has two employment spells we 
combine the annual earnings with the wage declared at the time of the interview to obtain the monthly 
wage. This method can introduce measurement errors in wages, but we consider it important to 
include individuals with more than one employment spell in the sample. However, if a worker has 
three or more employment spells within the same year, we cannot compute the monthly wage, and we 
therefore disregard these observations. We use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of each country to 
obtain real monthly wages
16.  
We have classified workers into three groups: stayers, voluntary movers and involuntary movers. The 
first group is composed of those workers that remain in the same job between two consecutive 
interviews. The voluntary character of the job separation is not explicitly reported in the data, so we 
require an ad hoc definition. We consider as voluntary all job changes characterized by the absence of 
an unemployment spell between two consecutive jobs.
17 Operationally, a job separation occurs every 
time an individual leaves a particular job. In most of the empirical literature, job separation variables 
are broadly defined as being any situation where an individual has different employers in two 
consecutive or non-consecutive interviews
18. Hence, they cannot identify wages at the moment of 
moving to another job, that is, accepted wages. However, the point at which wages are measured is 
very important to correctly measure the costs produced by an unemployment spell, especially because 
there may be on-the-job wage growth. In our case, given the way we construct the data, we are able to  
obtain wages at the moment of moving. Thus, we can approximate it to the concept of accepted wages.   
Our final sample estimation consists of men aged between 20 and 60 years old, that is, workers with a 
stronger attachment to the labour force. In addition, we discard observations with missing data on the 
                                                           
15 Information on hours worked is also available but it restricts the sample considerably. Previous works show that wage 
losses based on monthly wages are larger than those based on hourly wages (Stern, 1989; Gregory and Jukes, 1997). This is 
probably due to the change in monthly labour hours.  
16 We take 1993 as the base for deflated wages for each country, which are all expressed in Euros. 
17 Obviously, we are considering as voluntary some cases where the employer induces job changes. For example, if the 
employer announces in advance to the worker that he will be laid off, forcing him to search on-the-job and possibly find 
another job before being fired.  
18 This is the most common approach followed by empirical works that use panel data methodology to estimate wage losses 








wage prior to the unemployment spell or to the current job in the case of job movers. This last 
restriction has the effect of excluding those who have never been employed
19 during the period of 
observation and all the observations with left-censored spells of unemployment. Besides we also 
exclude those observations without known employment length. Since the worker must report the 
characteristics of his current job, we always condition the analysis on previous wage and tenure. For 
the purposes of the paper, we assume that different spells involving the same individual are 
independent events
20. We show in Table 1 the final sample sizes for each country.  
4.1  Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation Sample 
In Table 2 we show the distribution of job tenure for the whole sample and for completed job spells. 
Firstly, we observe that long job spells predominate, since more than 50% of those workers who were 
initially observed in employment were still in the same job after eight years. This ratio is slightly 
higher in France, around 66%. When we look at completed job spells the distribution changes, since in 
all countries the conditional probability of exiting from the current job is the highest during the first 
year of employment. This probability is much larger in Spain 52%, than in the rest of countries where 
this ratio varies from 29% in Germany to 35% in France. These statistics reflect the fact that, 
especially in Spain, the rate of temporality is high, which provokes the existence of a dual labour 
market characterized by stable workers with long job tenures and unstable workers with short job 
spells
21 and repeated unemployment experiences (Dolado y Jimeno, 1995; García-Pérez and Rebollo, 
2005). Finally, in the last two rows of Table 2 we show the percentage of jobs ending in 
unemployment and job-to-job transitions as an indicator of voluntary
22 and involuntary job mobility 
conditional on job termination. Clearly, in all countries job-to-unemployment transitions predominate. 
Nevertheless, if we compare among countries we observe that on average, transitions to 
unemployment are more common in Spain and Germany than in France and Portugal.  
Another way of describing the process of transitions is set out in Figure 1, which shows the 
employment exit probability for each country. The impression they give is that of a small amount of 
negative duration dependence, since it seems that workers with longer job tenure are somewhat less 
likely to have their jobs terminated at a given point in time. Nevertheless, mainly for Spain and 
France, we find a clear negative duration dependence for workers with a tenure of less than one year
23.  
Figure   2 represents the transitions from unemployment to employment by plotting the unemployment 
exit probability. Flows out of unemployment are higher for short durations and drop afterward to 
                                                           
19 This restriction reduces the sample size by 22% in Germany and 40% in France. The average unemployment duration of 
this group of workers is quite long, around 40 months. Being long-term unemployed, it is logical that their age is also above 
the sample mean (around 40 years in all countries).  
20 The use of multiple-spell data on unemployment and employment duration provides greater variation. However, this also 
raises the possibility of selection bias, since workers who have multiple employment or unemployment spells may belong to 
a non-random sample.  
21 These results are not surprising given that the share of temporary contracts in Spain is around 30%, the highest of the 
European Union. 
22 We are aware that given the way we construct the data, these job-to-job transitions may hide an unemployment spell of less 
than one month.  








remain roughly constant for unemployment durations of longer than one year
24. Figure 2 also shows 
that there are large peaks at 12 and 24 months of unemployment. Given the way the data on spells of 
unemployment and employment is collected in the ECPH, they can be related to recall errors. 
Once we have described the most relevant empirical facts regarding job turnover we then start 
analysing wage mobility by distinguishing three types of states: stayers, voluntary movers and 
involuntary job movers. In Table 3 we present their main sample characteristics. Firstly, we observe 
that there are marked differences among the three groups in all the variables considered. This supports 
the need to separately analyse each group of workers. Workers with unemployment transitions are 
younger. They have lower job tenures, a lower level of studies and have more unemployment 
experiences. If we compare them among countries, we observe that young workers in Spain and 
France face a higher probability of having an involuntary job transition than in Germany. This 
difference among younger workers might partially reflect the greater tendency of young Spanish and 
French  workers to enter into unstable jobs. On the opposite side we have the group of stayers, who 
are older workers with longer job tenure, higher educational attainments and less unemployment 
experiences before the current job. Finally, in the case of job-to-job transitions we observe certain 
differences between the countries analysed. In Spain, France and Portugal these workers are more 
similar to unemployed workers in the sense that their sample characteristics (job tenure and age) are 
closer to those of an unemployed worker. On the contrary, voluntary job movers in Germany are, on 
average, more similar to the group of stayers.  
One well-documented fact regarding wages is that more senior or more experienced workers tend to 
earn higher wages (Abraham and Farber, 1987; Abowd and Kang, 2002). This phenomenon may be 
illustrated by comparing the distribution of wages for stayers, who represent more senior workers, to 
that of involuntary job movers, which should include more job entrants. Firstly, in Table 3 we display 
the current and previous wage, the average wage growth and the percentage of wage losers for each 
group. Comparing wages among stayers and movers we observe that the former generally have higher 
wages. Given this, one could be tempted to conclude that job mobility is not beneficial in term of 
wages. But the relevant question is not whether job movers earn lower wages on average, but whether 
job mobility contributes to increase or decrease their current wage relative to the previous one. 
We observe that the mean wage growth declines as we move from the group of stayers to the group of 
voluntary and involuntary movers. Moreover, the probability of having a wage cut is lower for stayers 
-between 5% and 8% - than for the other two groups. One striking fact is that a substantial share of 
job-to-job transitions is associated with wage cuts. These figures suggest that not all job-to-job 
transitions are initially a favourable event for workers. We find this last result interesting since it 
shows that to explain worker’s behaviour and its relation with job mobility decisions one must 
consider that workers may “voluntarily” accept wage cuts as a better option than unemployment.  
In Table 3 we also distinguish between censored
25 and completed spells for unemployed workers to 
ascertain if there are relevant divergences between them. We find that in all countries workers with 
                                                           
24 In Spain, Germany and Portugal we observe that the exit probability increases abruptly at month twelve. This is due to the 
way the data is collected, since individuals have to recall their labour market situation prior to the year of the interview. On 
the contrary, in France individuals have to describe their labour market situation during the twelve months prior to the 








completed unemployment spells face a higher probability of having being unemployed before those 
spells. This might imply that workers who tend to exit earlier from unemployment also tend to enter 
into unstable jobs. In almost all cases this probability is relatively high and again Spain stands out as 
having the highest one, 82% for completed spells and 69% for censored observations. In France these 
probabilities are slightly lower but still higher than in Germany and Portugal, at 63% and 44% 
respectively.  
Finally, from Table 3 we can also draw the preliminary conclusion that, on average, wage losses after 
unemployment strongly differ among countries. Interestingly, though we have found that Spain and 
France have certain labour market similarities related to the larger share of short job spells, they 
present quite different results in terms of wage losses. German workers face the largest wage penalties 
around -14%, followed by the Spanish around -4%, the Portuguese, around -3% and the French around 
0%. Consequently, the share of wage losers after unemployment is larger in Germany and Spain, 
around 62% and 53% respectively, than in Portugal and France, around 51% and 44% respectively.  
As explained before, we partition each national sample into three groups according  to the educational 
attainment of the worker. We distinguish among primary, secondary and tertiary education, except for 
Portugal where we can only consider the first two cases
26. Table 3 displays the main sample 
characteristics of unemployed workers for each group.  It can be seen that the level of studies is an 
important source of observed heterogeneity. In all countries wages increase as we move from primary 
to secondary and tertiary education and when we look at average wage changes this relationship also 
holds, except for Germany where workers with secondary and university education  have similar 
average wage changes after unemployment. We also find that, even when comparing by educational 
attainments levels, German workers experience the highest wage losses and French workers the lowest 
ones. Table 4 also demonstrates that the share of wage losers and the average wage loss closely follow 
the pattern of the average wage change. Again, German workers face the worst ratios in both cases. 
The last rows of Table 4 represent the average length of the unemployment spell and the distribution 
of workers according to the length of unemployment.  Under the traditional approach which assumes 
that real wage rigidity is the main source of high unemployment, one would expect to find that 
countries with higher unemployment rates and/or workers with a longer mean unemployment duration 
should also have lower average wage losses. However, when we compare average wage changes with 
mean unemployment duration this situation does not clearly arise.   
4.2  Implementation and Variables Selected  
We estimate the model separately for each country and for three groups of workers, classified 
according to their educational attainments (primary, secondary and tertiary)
27. In this way, we are able 
to control for observed heterogeneity along the highly important dimension of education. Moreover, to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
25 Apart from the intrinsically censored spells, all unemployed workers with unemployment spells of longer than 24 months 
are considered as censored because we cannot estimate the exit probability for such durations due to the lack of data 
variation. 
26 Due to minimum sample size requirements we omit from the analysis the group of Portuguese workers with a university 
degree. 








reflect the way in which the economic structural parameters vary across individuals, we express them 
as functions of certain individual characteristics
28. We use as explanatory variables three age 
categories (age20-30,  age30-45,  age45-60), four levels of job tenure (te<12, te12-24, te24-48 and te>48), the 
previous wage and an indicator for the presence of previous unemployment experience (uexp). All 
covariates are coded as dummy variables except the previous wage which is a continuous one
29.  
In Table 5 we describe the functional form for each model’s parameter. The value of time while 
unemployed depends on the previous wage, job tenure and age. With this specification we try to 
reflect the effect of Unemployment Benefits on the acceptance behaviour of unemployed workers. 
Thus, we introduce a dummy variable indicating whether the worker might be entitled to receive such 
benefits. Though there are differences among countries, all of them have in common that the eligibility 
condition to receive Unemployment Benefits is related to job tenure. In Spain and Germany workers  
require a tenure of at least 12 months, 18 months in Portugal and 4 in France
30. The job offers 
probability while unemployed and outside wage offers also depends on whether the worker is entitled 
to receive Unemployment Benefits. Again, we use this specification because we could think that 
workers who are not eligible for such benefits will search more intensively even when employed
31. 
Mean offered wages for movers depend both on age and on previous tenure and mean offered wages 
for involuntary movers are also made dependent on the dummy variable previous unemployment 
experience. The idea is to confirm whether workers with previous unemployment spells face a penalty 
in terms of lower offered wages. This scarring effect has already been studied in previous papers
32 but 
the economic mechanism underlying this phenomenon is not clear-cut. In the present analysis we test 
if this scarring effect is related to lower wage offers while unemployed. Inside wage offers depend on 
current wages, job tenure and age. With this specification we can analyse whether wage growth 
increases with tenure and whether job stability is more common for longer tenure workers. Finally, we 
also introduce heterogeneity through the distribution of previous wages, by relating the previous wage 
with age, tenure, civil status and year dummies. The remaining parameters to be estimated are the 
variances of the different wage offer distribution functions, the variance of the measurement error, the 
variance of the previous wage, the variance of the reservation wage, and the parameter that measures 
the reliability of the reported reservation wage. All of these are estimated as constant terms.  
5 Estimation  Results 
The results of the structural estimation are presented in Table 6 distinguished according to the 
educational attainments for each country. We comment now on the most relevant results.  
                                                           
28 Since the structural model is stationary, all state dependence –mainly observed in the unemployment exit probability-, is 
attributed to observed heterogeneity. 
29 Since one of the main regressors of our model is the previous wage, we compute the reservation wage for each individual 
in the sample. 
30 In the case of France we have hardly any observations of job tenure of less than five months. Nevertheless we opted to 
keep the dummy variable of job tenure of less than 12 months in the specification of the value of time while unemployed. 
31 Though we do not use the information on the type of contract in the job, a high percentage of unemployed workers without 
unemployment benefits come from temporary jobs, especially in Spain.  
32 For instance, Gregory and Jukes (2001) found an important scarring effect of previous unemployment on current wages in 
the United Kingdom. García-Pérez and Rebollo (2005) studied the scarring effect for the same four countries and found it 








Firstly, as expected, the value of time while unemployed is strongly related to the wage obtained in the 
previous job. Given the selected functional form, the constant term α0, represents the dependence of 
the value of time while unemployed relative to the previous wage. In all countries this constant term 
increases as we move from primary to tertiary education, meaning that the value of time while 
unemployed is greater the higher the worker’s education level. We would expect that short tenure 
workers, due to the conditions governing entitlement to Unemployment Benefits, would have a lower 
value of time while unemployed. Interestingly, this is the case in Spain, France and Portugal while in 
Germany the effect of this dummy variable is not statistically significant. One possible explanation for 
this difference is that Germany offers Unemployment Assistance (UA) benefits, which are connected 
to the previous wage
33, whereas in the other three countries these benefits are independent of previous 
wages
34. This result is consistent with the idea, already put forward (see OECD, 2000), that 
unemployed workers who are also eligible or expect to become eligible for social assistance 
programmes are less concerned about Unemployment Benefits. Finally, we also obtain a positive 
relationship between the value of time while unemployed and the worker’s age in all cases. This result 
can also be related to Unemployment Benefits since they also tend to be related to worker’s age. 
The job offers probability while unemployed is higher for workers not entitled to receive 
Unemployment Benefits, except for French workers with primary and secondary studies. This result 
might reflect a greater search effort on the part of these workers. Therefore, the stylised fact of lower 
exit probabilities for workers with such benefits (Meyer, 1990; Crémieux, 1995) can be interpreted 
within this semi-structural estimation
35. From our results we expect that workers who receive these 
benefits have a larger value of time while unemployed and a lower job offers probability. 
Consequently, the unemployment exit probability will be lower.  
We do not find a clear relationship between wage offers for unemployed workers and job tenure in the 
previous job. In Spain, France and Portugal, receiving lower wage offers does not penalize short-
tenure workers. On the contrary, German workers with secondary and university education face lower 
wage offers, as job tenure is lower. Finally, German workers with primary studies face no penalty at 
all. When we relate age to wage offers we obtain a non-linear relationship, since middle-aged workers 
receive the highest wage offers. Finally, the scarring effect of previous spells of unemployment on 
current wage offers while unemployed exists in Germany and Portugal independently of the education 
level. In Spain this effect arises only in the case of workers with a university degree while in France 
this effect arises with respect to workers with secondary and primary education.  
The probability of outside offers is higher for short-tenure workers, which supports the idea that they 
search more intensively because their opportunity cost of becoming unemployed is greater. Our results 
                                                           
33 The Unemployment Assistance (UA) benefits in Germany are connected to the previous wage and are equivalent to 57% of 
the wage for workers with at least one child and 53% in other cases. The drop in the benefit level is thus relatively small 
when the eligibility period of UI benefits expires.   
34 For instance, in Spain, this type of UA benefit is equivalent to only 75% of the minimum legal wage, which represents at 
the most 50% of the average wage. In France it consists of a daily wage that is also equivalent to less than 50% of the average 
wage. In Portugal, UA benefits are between 70%-90% of the minimum wage and therefore they also represent at the most 
50% of the average wage.  
35 We are aware that these results are based on a reduced form specification built on top of the structural model. In order to 
explain these results from a structural approach a more comprehensive structure of the model would be required. Concretely, 








also indicate that, as we assumed in the theoretical model, the job offer probability is higher when 
unemployed than when employed. 
From the results we cannot establish a clear relationship between outside job offers and their 
explanatory variables, age and job tenure. Though one would expect that outside job offers increase 
with tenure, we find this effect is relevant only in certain cases. Similarly, if we consider that age acts 
as a proxy for total labour experience we would expect a positive relationship between outside job 
offers and age. However this is not the result in all cases. It could be that the reduced sample size used 
to estimate this part of the likelihood is behind this lack of significance.  
Inside wage offers depend positively on previous wages and job tenure. Interestingly, these offers are 
clearly lower for those with a tenure of less than 24 months, with this effect clearly stronger in Spain 
than in the rest of the countries considered. This result implies that the wage penalty after 
unemployment seems to be longer in Spain than in the other three countries. Inside wage offers also 
increase with worker’s age. Finally, previous wages were also found to be positively related to job 
tenure and age. Moreover, they are higher for non-single workers.  
In the last rows of Table 6 we display the variances of the different wage distribution functions. As 
expected, the variance of the wage offer distribution function for unemployed workers and for outside 
job offers is clearly larger than for inside wage offers. Moreover, in all cases the variance of offered 
wages for unemployed workers is larger than for outside offers.  
Measurement errors exist in our model but they are not especially important since the variance due to 
measurement error represents only between 10 and 20% of total variance, depending on the education 
group. Finally, the reported reservation wages are higher than the estimated ones, which represent 
between 58% and 81% of the self-reported reservation wage.  
To obtain an additional insight into the functioning of the model we have simulated a change in each 
parameter by ±10%, conditional on our estimations
36, computing the effect of these changes on  the 
main outcome variables. In Table 7 we report the corresponding elasticities for each parameter change 
by country and education level. Most of the signs of these elasticities are familiar from the job search 
literature (see, for example, Devine and Kiefer, 1991), although we consider it important to highlight 
one result obtained in our estimation. The parameters relating job and wage mobility while employed 
strongly affect reservation wages. The higher the probability of experiencing wage growth while 
employed, either due to job-to-job mobility or internal wage mobility, the lower the reservation wage 
and subsequently the lower the re-employment wage.  
Before going further in the analysis it is worthwhile to ascertain whether the model’s predictions are 
consistent with the data. We use the basic specification of the model to compare sample mean values 
of re-employment wages, average wage changes, the share of wage losses and the average wage loss 
to the same figures predicted by the model in the three educational groups and for each country
37. The 
results are displayed in Table 8. In all cases our model does a fairly good job at matching re-
                                                           
36 We have also simulated the model changing the parameters by ±5% and the results are equivalent. 
37 We compute the predicted values as the expectations of the accepted wages following the specifications provided by the 








employment wages. However, we tend to underestimate the average wage change. The average wage 
loss is notably closed to the observed data while the share of wage losers is estimated with less 
precision
38. 
The predicted values for the main structural parameters in the model are displayed in Table 9. In the 
first part we report the main outcomes of the basic job search model for unemployed individuals 
together with different indicators that help us to analyse the source of the differences in the reservation 
wage adjustment mechanism among the countries analysed.  It should be borne in mind that in order to 
explain observed wage losses two main mechanisms arise from the model just presented. Firstly, the 
existence of substantial returns  from work experience makes the new job a stepping-stone towards 
better jobs. Therefore, individuals will be less selective in accepting a job when unemployed and 
consequently reservation wages will be lower. In this case the initial wage loss will shortly turn into a 
wage gain as workers accumulate job tenure and experience. Secondly, workers may have a low 
reservation wage due to the low value of the job offer probability, the offer wage or the value of time 
while unemployed – perhaps because they do not receive Unemployment Benefits. In this case the 
unemployed worker will possibly experience a wage loss, which will tend to remain while employed 
for a certain period of time. 
The reservation wage to previous wage ratio can be related to the observed average wage change after 
unemployment. One would expect that workers with a higher reservation wage to previous wage ratio 
face larger wage changes after unemployment. For instance, French workers face the largest wage 
changes and also have the highest reservation wage to previous wage ratio. On the contrary, German 
workers have the largest wage penalties after unemployment and also have the lowest reservation 
wage to previous wage ratio. Moreover, except for Germany, this ratio is also higher for workers with 
a university degree, who also tend to have lower average wage losses. These differences in the 
reservation wage strategy may be a consequence of both supply and demand factors. If the observed 
wage losses were explained by supply factors
39, the value of time while unemployed to previous wage 
ratio would be higher when the average wage change is also higher. However, this result does not 
generally hold among all the countries analysed. For instance, the value of time while unemployed to 
previous wage ratio tends to be lower in Spain than in Germany while wage losses are greater in the 
latter country. On the contrary, this result seems to hold when we compare France and Portugal with 
the other two countries. 
Given that the behaviour of the value of time while unemployed to previous wage ratio does not 
completely explain observed wage changes, and in particular why Germany faces larger wage losses, 
we have to look for other factors. Firstly, we might look into the other structural parameters relating 
(related?) to the unemployment situation such as job offers probability and the mean offer wage. The 
first structural parameter varies among countries and types of workers and it is difficult to find a clear 
pattern. The unemployed offer wage to previous wage ratio is the highest for Spain followed by the 
two countries with higher average wage changes, France and Portugal. In Germany this ratio  is 
                                                           
38 We also checked the model’s predictions for job movers and stayers. The model predicts average wage changes for stayers 
quite well while it tends to overpredict average wage change for job movers. 
39 This argument has been used to explain observed differences in wage losses after unemployment between countries 








around 50% for workers with a university degree and 57% for workers with primary and secondary 
studies, while in Spain it ranges from 83% for workers with secondary studies to 76% for workers 
with primary studies. In fact, this result may explain the lower acceptance probability found in 
Germany
40. Therefore, this ratio can help to explain the larger wage losses of German workers but it 
fails to justify the larger wage losses found for Spanish workers relative to their French and 
Portuguese counterparts. Moreover, if we look at Table 7 we observe that the elasticity of the 
reservation wage and the re-employment wage with respect to the unemployed offer wage is lower 
compared to other structural parameters such as the value of time while unemployed or outside and 
inside wage offers. Therefore, to understand average wage change differences we need to look into 
other economic factors related to workers’ expectations when employed.  
When we examine workers’ expectations while employed, represented by the probability and the 
amount of the wage gain associated with internal wage mobility and job-to-job mobility, we again 
obtain large differences among countries. The outside wage offer to unemployed wage offer ratio tends 
to be larger in Germany than in the rest of the countries studied, and is also larger in Spain than in 
France and Portugal. This could be interpreted as a consequence of the fact that expected wage gains 
from job-to-job transitions are larger in Germany than in the other countries. The inside wage offer to 
unemployed wage offer ratio also indicates that German workers are better rewarded once employed 
than their Spanish, French and Portuguese counterparts.  
In terms of the exit probabilities, excluding the rate applicable to job-to-job transitions involving wage 
gains, the rest of the exit probabilities are more favourable for German workers than for Spanish and 
Portuguese workers, while French workers have the best internal wage mobility probability. These 
results support the idea that French and German workers have better opportunities of getting good job 
offers when employed than their Spanish and Portuguese counterparts. The higher exit probability for 
job-to-job mobility involving wage gains found in Spain and France is mainly explained by the higher 
rate of outside job offers
41. This result is consistent with the idea put forward previously that in Spain 
and France job-to-job transitions are more common but they imply lower returns in terms of better 
wages than in Germany and Portugal.  
Some interesting results also arise when comparing the job offers probability and the acceptance 
probability of outside job offers with the rates for unemployed workers. Firstly, in all countries the job 
offers probability for such workers is higher than that of outside job offers, with these differences 
being the main determinant of the corresponding exit probabilities
42. Secondly, the probability of 
                                                           
40 In terms of the worker’s acceptance behaviour, this probability is greater in Spain (varying between 68% and 76%), than in 
the rest of countries, (varying between 39% and 57%). On the contrary, Germany has the lowest acceptance probability. 
These differences could be related to differences in the value of time while unemployed to previous wage ratio and in the 
wage offer to previous wage ratio. If we look at Table 7 we observe that the acceptance behaviour is highly sensitive to the 
value of time while unemployed. Therefore we can relate the stronger acceptance behaviour of Spanish workers to their 
lower value of time while unemployed to previous wage ratio. Moreover, the behaviour of the unemployment exit probability 
depends on job offers and the acceptance probability. We have computed the elasticity of the unemployment exit probability 
with respect to the job offers probability and, as expected, it is positive but low. Therefore, the acceptance probability plays a 
very important role in determining the unemployment exit probability.  
41 In Spain this ratio remains at around 5% while in France it increases with the level of studies from 5% to 9%.  
42 This implies that unemployed search is more effective than employed search. Burdett (1978) argued that if job offers in 








accepting a job offer while employed is similar to the acceptance probability for the unemployed in 
Spain and Germany, except for German workers with a university degree, in which case the 
probability is much higher. In France and Portugal, the probability of accepting a job offer while 
employed is around 10 percentage points lower than the acceptance probability for the unemployed. 
These results imply that although the search intensity is higher in unemployment, acceptable job offers 
occur with a similar frequency when unemployed and when employed, especially in Spain. 
Consequently, we obtain the interesting result that searching while unemployed does not generate an 
important efficiency gain through a quicker matching of vacancies and job searches 
43. Moreover, the 
estimated wage returns to searching when unemployed are clearly lower than when employed, 
especially in Germany.  
Finally, the exit probability for job-to-job mobility associated with wage losses is higher in Spain too. 
This last result is also related to the fact that the probability of receiving an acceptable inside wage 
offer is lower in Spain than in the rest of countries. Consequently, the exit probability from 
employment to unemployment is the highest in Spain.  
We are also interested in analysing whether wage losses tend to disappear as the worker continues in 
employment. To analyse this issue we display in Table 9 the average wage change for wage losers 
after four years of employment and the average exit probability to unemployment during those four 
years. If we focus on Spain and Germany, the countries with greater wage losses after unemployment, 
in both cases the results are more favourable for German workers than for  Spanish workers. This 
result confirms the fact that on-the-job wage growth is higher in Germany than in Spain and, though 
initial wage losses after unemployment are greater for German workers, they tend to disappear more 
rapidly as the worker has a higher probability of remaining employed.  
The results set out above indicates that the traditional argument of wage rigidity fails to explain the 
observed divergence found with respect to average wage changes after unemployment. In this line, we 
should have observed higher value of time while unemployed to previous wage ratios. However this 
argument fails to explain the larger wage penalties found in Germany relative to those found in Spain. 
Since Spain  suffers higher unemployment rates we could initially think that wage rigidity is the right 
argument to explain this difference. Nevertheless,  the above results support the conclusion that wage 
losses in Germany, compared to those found in Spain, are partly a consequence of better employment 
opportunities for employed workers.  
6  Policy Evaluation Exercises 
One of the main advantages of a structural estimation is that it enables a simulation of the effects of 
different policy interventions on the outcomes of the model that are not always directly observable, 
such as the worker’s reservation wage strategy, the value of time while unemployed, the job offers 
probability and the acceptance behaviour of workers. The model presented provides interesting 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the use of Unemployment Benefits to subsidise unemployed job search as a means of increasing efficiency in the labour 
market.  
43 Despite the importance of this issue, the empirical evidence supporting this result is limited. Early results in the US suggest 
that the job offers probability is higher in unemployment although the estimated wage returns to unemployed search are not 








insights into how certain elements of the economic environment influence the reservation wage 
strategy of workers and consequently the average wage change after unemployment. We will focus on 
the analysis of policies related to different unemployment compensation schemes. Our model assumes 
that Unemployment Benefits and their dependence on previous wages might have a strong causal 
effect on the acceptance behaviour of workers and consequently on the wage change after 
unemployment
44. We will now analyse the effects on the average wage change of some variations in 
the structure of the Unemployment Benefits system in each of the countries analysed, and consider  
the reforms that have been proposed in various European countries such as Germany
45 and France
46. 
The empirical literature hardly addresses the effect of the level of benefits on wages in post-
unemployment jobs. Here, we will evaluate the effect of any policy variation on three outcome 
variables: the unemployment exit probability, the average wage change and the share of wage losers.  
The main results of these policy changes are set out in Tables 9 and 10. The first two policies affect all 
workers and are shown in Table 10. The third affects only certain groups of workers and is displayed 
in Table 11. 
Firstly, we analyse the consequences of reducing the level of Unemployment Benefits. This is the 
policy measure most commonly analysed and has often been proposed as a way to reduce structural 
unemployment (OECD, 2000). We model it assuming that the level of such benefits (represented in 
our empirical model by α0) is reduced by 10%. We already know that the reservation wage is quite 
sensitive to variations in the value of time while unemployed; therefore this policy must have a 
relevant impact on main outcome variables (as was shown in Table 7). As expected, the exit 
probability increases in all cases, but the changes are the largest in Portugal and the smallest in Spain. 
Therefore, as has already been put forward in the literature, if wage rigidity were the cause of the high 
unemployment rate, one possible solution would be to reduce UI benefits. Nevertheless, the results 
shown point out that this policy brings about important welfare costs since in all cases wage losses 
strongly increase and, except for French workers with a university degree, it also results in large 
negative wage changes after the unemployment spell. These negative effects are more relevant for 
those cases where wage losses tend to be permanent, as is the case in Spain. Evidently, the share of 
wage losers also increases in all cases.  
Another possibility is  to change the manner of  computing Unemployment Benefits. Our model 
assumes an unemployment compensation level dependent on the worker’s earnings during his 
previous job. We may assume that such benefits are the same across individuals and independent of 
the previous wage. To simulate this policy change we assume that Unemployment Benefits are 70% of 
the average national wage (a design similar in spirit to the one implemented in the UK). This means 
                                                           
44 Though the functional form given to the value of time while unemployed attempts to reflect the relation of this function to 
Unemployment Benefits, we are aware that the specification of the value of time while unemployed used in this paper does 
not totally reproduce replicate them as there seem to be additional elements influencing the workers’ value of time while 
unemployed. This divergence is larger for French and Portuguese workers and for workers with a university degree.  
45 Recently, the German Government adopted an important reform of the Unemployment Benefits system. Among other 
things, the reform tries to break the relation between tax-financed unemployment benefits and previous wages. Besides, 
employment offices will also be able to withdraw benefits if jobless people refuse employment offers (IMF, 2004). 
46 In 2000 the French government adopted reforms that affected the functioning of the Unemployment Benefits system aimed 








that the dispersion of the value of time while unemployed will mainly depend on the entitlement 
condition and on the worker’s age. The consequences of this policy change are ambiguous since, 
obviously, they depend on the position of the worker in the wage distribution. This policy clearly 
decreases Unemployment Benefits for high wage workers –highly skilled workers-, while it may 
increase them for low wage workers –lowly skilled workers. This is the case of workers with primary 
and secondary studies in Spain, Germany and France while in Portugal only workers with primary 
studies benefit from this policy variation. These workers experience a significant drop in the 
unemployment exit probability and a significant increase in the average wage change. On the contrary, 
workers with a high level of studies experience the largest drop in Unemployment Benefits and 
subsequently suffer the greatest negative effects of this policy change. The unemployment exit 
probability and the share of wage losers among workers with a university degree clearly increase in 
Spain, Germany and France, and also for workers with secondary studies in Portugal. Since wage 
losses after unemployment tend to be larger and more permanent for lowly skilled workers, this policy 
change could be recommended in order to reduce this negative effect.  The problem of job stability is 
stronger among lowly skilled workers and consequently this policy variation might also be justified 
from this perspective. However, it also decreases the unemployment exit probability for these workers, 
and consequently it might increase the problem of long-term unemployment, common in all the 
European countries analysed. 
Finally, we consider a third policy change consisting of withdrawing Unemployment Benefits if the 
worker rejects a job offer. Nowadays sanctions or punitive benefit reductions are increasingly used as 
a tool to enforce compliance of unemployment insurance claimants with search requirements
47 (see 
Grubb 1999, for example). To simulate this policy we first compute the probability of rejecting a job 
offer, and then use this probability to compute the new value of time while unemployed considering 
the penalty effect of rejecting a job offer. Therefore, unemployed workers with a high probability of 
rejecting a job offer are penalized by this policy. The higher the probability, the value of time while 
unemployed drops larger. We can see in Table 11 that these sanctions do not have major effects on the 
main outcome variables. This result matches with the low elasticity of the reservation wage to the 
unemployed offer wage function displayed in Table 7. The signs of the effects on the relevant outcome 
variables are the same as in the previous cases, but the magnitudes are clearly lower. In fact, the 
unemployment exit probability hardly changes and a small negative change is observed in the average 
wage change.  
7 Conclusions 
This paper presents a partial equilibrium job search model with on-the-job search and on-the-job wage 
growth to account for alternative sources of wage losses after an unemployment spell. The main 
advantage of this approach is that, within the structural model of job search behaviour, labour market 
transitions and wages are jointly determined via the acceptance behaviour of workers and thus the 
interdependence of these variables can be studied. Once the model is derived, we estimate it 
structurally using data regarding unemployment and employment spells and wages from the ECHP for 
                                                           








Spain, Germany, France and Portugal for the period 1994-2001. The model is estimated separately for 
each country and for three groups of workers classified according to their education levels.  
The model does a relatively good job at matching observed outcomes such as the re-employment 
wage, the average wage change, the average wage loss and the share of wage losers. As can be seen 
from the data, the wage losses are greater in Germany and Spain than in France and Portugal. One of 
the main differences between these two groups of countries is that French and Portuguese workers 
have a higher value of time while unemployed to previous wage ratio.  If we focus on those countries 
with greater average wage losses the question arises whether the source of the wage loss is the same. 
We have found that the value of time while unemployed to previous wage ratio tends to be higher in 
Germany than in Spain while worker’s expectations while employed seem to be better for German 
than for Spanish workers. Though job-to-job mobility is more common in Spain, we have also found 
that a higher share of job-to-job transitions imply wage cuts. Moreover, wage gains from internal wage 
mobility and outside wage offers are clearly larger in Germany than in Spain. Finally, we have found 
that wage losses tend to remain longer once employed in Spain than in Germany and job stability after 
unemployment is also less common in Spain than in Germany. 
We also use the model’s structural parameters to evaluate alternative policy interventions for 
unemployed workers. We demonstrate that different reforms in the UI Benefits system have different 
effects on worker’s reservation wage strategies and therefore on wage changes after unemployment. 
We have analysed three types of policy measures aimed at reducing the level of UI benefits. Firstly, 
we assume a linear reduction in UI benefits by 10%. This is the most effective policy in terms of 
changes generated in the unemployment exit probability, at the cost of sharply increasing average 
wage cuts. A second policy consists of eliminating the UI benefits when a job offer is rejected. We 
have seen that this policy change has much lower effects on the main outcome variables. Interestingly, 
we have also found that a policy which makes unemployment compensation constant for all workers 
has ambiguous effects on the average wage change. For low wage workers this policy decreases the 
unemployment exit probability and decreases the probability of experiencing a wage loss, whereas the 
opposite effect is found for high wage workers. Given these results, this type of policy could be 
interesting when low wage workers experience low wage growth while employed, and accordingly 
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Appendix I: Functional Form Specification for Wage Offers 
 
The wages observed in our sample are accepted wages by unemployed or employed individuals after a 
wage renegotiation or after a job-to-job transition. The accepted wages of the unemployed are 
drawings from the density function f(wu1/wu>wr), the accepted wages for job movers are drawings 
from g(wm1/wm>w0) and, equivalently, the accepted wage for stayers with wage growth are  drawings 
from  h(ws1/ws>wr,w0). The distribution function of duration and accepted wages, given that the 
unemployed individual has found a job is represented by the following expression: 
(10)  ( ) ( ) 10 1 /, /
u u wu u w u ur fw t w fwww =≥  
where w1u is the observed re-employment wage, wu is the wage offer to unemployed individuals, and tu 
is the length of the unemployment spell. In order to identify the parameters of the model we have to 
make distributional assumptions on  u w f . Note that this density function is well defined only if the 
current wage is greater than the reservation wage for the month in which the worker actually finds a 
job. This can result in extreme sensitivity of the estimates to a few outliers. To prevent this possibility, 
we make the plausible assumption that wages are lognormal and measured with error
48. Given both 
assumptions we arrive at the following expression of the density function of wage offers to 
unemployed individuals, taking into account that observed wages are truncated from below: 
(11) 
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where σε and σν are the standard deviations of the measurement error and the random error of wages 
respectively. Furthermore, we have that:  
(12) 
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Using the same assumptions, we define the density function of inside and outside wage offers. 
However, in this case the truncation point is different, since an employed worker will accept an 
outside job offer if the offered wage is superior to the wage he earns in the current job.  
                                                           
48 The assumption of measurement error on accepted wages does not affect the solution of the model, but does affect 
estimation through the likelihood function. Stern (1989) and Christensen and Kiefer (1991) present strong evidence that 
measurement error is an important empirical event. Stern (1989) argues that there may be two different types of measurement 
errors in wage data. First, there may be errors in reporting wages or inputting tax rates or price levels. Second, the value of a 








Appendix II: Tables  
 
Table 1: Sample Size 
   Spain Germany France  Portugal
Unemployment Spells   Total  2381  1533  609  1097 
 Primary  68%  22%  48%  86% 
 Secondary  19%  61%  33%  10% 
 Tertiary  13%  17%  19%  4% 
Employment Spells  Total  3991  4358  4705  3558 
 Primary  56%  27%  38%  83% 
 Secondary  19%  58%  32%  11% 




Table 2: Job Spells Durations 
  Months  <  12 12-24 24-36 36-48  48-60  60-72 72-84  >84  Average 
Spain  19%  8% 5% 4%  3%  3% 3%  55%  - 
Germany 7% 10%  8%  7% 6% 5%  4% 51%  - 
France  4%  4% 6% 5%  5%  4% 4%  66%  - 
All workers  
Portugal  12%  7% 6% 6%  5%  4% 5%  54%  - 
Spain 52%  14%  6%  4%  2%  2%  1%  17% - 
Germany 29% 20%  9%  6%  5%  4%  2%  24%  - 
France 35%  12%  9%  6%  6%  4%  4%  26%  - 
Completed 
Spells 
Portugal 33%  12% 7%  5% 5% 3%  4% 32%  - 
Spain  25%  27% 29% 30%  35%  24% 32% 18%  18% 
Germany  20%  15% 16% 27%  20%  28% 11% 15%  15% 
France  20%  33% 48% 46%  47%  38% 46% 40%  29% 
Voluntary 
Job Movers 
Portugal  33%  38% 42% 40%  30%  31% 22% 17%  25% 
Spain  74%  72% 70% 69%  64%  76% 67% 81%  81% 
Germany  79%  84% 83% 72%  80%  71% 88% 84%  84% 
France  79%  66% 51% 53%  52%  61% 53% 60%  70% 
Involuntary 
Job Movers 


























































1  Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Total Sample 
   Age  Tenure  (months) Education  N 











% of Wage 
Losers   
Stayers  12% 49%  39%  -  5%  9%  49%  20%  8%  -  1823  2062 13.1%  5%  3533 
V. Movers  33%  52% 15%  54% 10%  13% 65%  16%  57%  -  1403 1462  4.2%  43%  458 
I. 
Movers(Unce
nsored)  37% 42%  21%  68%  11%  7%  67%  19%  82%  6.6  1244  1199 -3.6%  53%  1575 
Spain 
I. Movers  
(Censored)  32% 36%  32%  60%  10%  8%  66%  18%  69%  8.8  1349  -  -  -  806 
Stayers  10%  50% 40%  -  8% 16% 14%  57%  3%  -  2358 2546  7.9%  8%  4100 
V. Movers  29%  57% 14%  31% 14%  19% 12%  53%  29%  -  2381 2436  2.3%  48%  258 
I. Movers 
 (Uncensored) 26%  46% 28%  35% 22%  14% 19%  65%  53%  5.6  2104 1802  -14.3% 62%  933 
Germany 
I. Movers  
(Censored)  17%  34% 48%  39% 12%  11% 24%  56%  36%  8.6  2102  -  -  -  600 
Stayers  11%  50% 38%  -  3% 11% 38%  32%  3%  -  2348 2525  7.5%  6%  4556 
V. Movers  32%  53% 15%  22% 12%  19% 36%  29%  19%  -  2094 2277  8.7%  32%  249 
I. Movers 
 (Uncensored) 38%  45% 17%  57% 11%  10% 43%  38%  63%  5.7  1632 1683  0.0%  44%  388 
France 
I. Movers  
(Censored)  24%  38%  38% 50% 7% 9% 55% 23%  44%  8.3  2023  -  -  -  221 
Stayers  26%  41% 33%  -  5% 12% 87%  12%  4%  -  760  812 6.8%  8%  3231 
V. Movers  50%  29% 20%  36% 14%  18% 88%  12%  25%  -  655  634 -3.2%  47%  327 
I. Movers 
 (Uncensored) 40%  36%  24% 41% 9% 8% 91%  8%  53%  6.1  623  604  -3.0% 51%  656 
Portugal 
I. Movers  
(Censored)  30%  32%  38% 39% 9% 9% 87% 12%  37%  9.6  679  -  -  -  441 









3  Table 4: Main Descriptive Statistics of Unemployed Workers by Skill Levels (Sample Means) 
 
 Spain  Germany  France  Portugal 
Level of Studies  Primary  Secondary  Tertiary   Primary   Secondary  Tertiary   Primary  Secondary  Tertiary  Primary    Secondary 
Previous Wage  1188 1233  1594  1976  2010  2304  1501  1596  1772 635  714 
Current Wage  1134 1208  1533  1656  1795  2058  1535  1669  2040 592  717 
Wage Change   -4.5%    -2.0%   -3.8%      -16.2%      -10.6%  -10.6%  0.0%       4.5%   15.0%     -6.7%      0.0% 
Share of Wage Losers   51%  48%   50%  65%  58%  62%   42%  45%   37%%  48%  51% 
Wage Loss   -23.4% -22.1% -25.2% -29.9%  -29.1% -29.1% -26.3%  -25.0% -20.8%  -23.4% -17.3% 
Unemp. Duration (uncensored)   6.8 7.2  6.9  6.9  5.6  5.9 6.3  5.9 4.9  6.3 5.4 
<6 months   53% 55%  51%  46%  58%  49%  57%  64%  59% 51%  48% 
6-12 months  27% 23%  25%  27%  22%  26%  16%  13%  13% 22%  26% 
>12 months  20% 22%  23%  27%  20%  24%  26%  22%  28% 27%  25% 













4  Table 5: Functional Form of the Model’s Parameters 
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5  Table 6: Model’s Parameters, Spain and Germany 
   Spain  Germany 
Level of Studies    Primary   Secondary   Tertiary   Primary   Secondary   Tertiary  
Constant term
  -0.15 (0.01)  0.02 (0.01)  0.02 (0.00)  -0.18 (0.00)  -0.22 (0.01)  0.02 (0.00)  Value of time while 
unemployed Tenure,  (<12)  -0.21 (0.00)    -0.22 (0.01)  -0.12 (0.00)    -0.01 (0.01)  0.00 (0.01)  0.00 (0.00) 
 Age  (20-30)  -0.13 (0.00)  -0.28 (0.01)  -0.17 (0.00)  -0.20 (0.00)  -0.17 (0.00)  -0.21 (0.00) 
 Age  (30-45)  -0.15 (0.00)  -0.13 (0.00)  -0.03 (0.00)  -0.10 (0.00)  -0.13 (0.00)  -0.01 (0.00) 
Constant term  -1.01 (0.04)  -1.30 (0.20)  -1.57 (0.01)  -0.97 (0.35)  -0.94 (0.20)  -1.30(0.35)  Job Offers Probability: 
Unemployed  Tenure (<12)  0.00 (0.00)  0.10 (0.01)  0.33 (0.00)  0.01 (0.02)  0.27 (0.10)  0.47 (0.12) 
Constant term  -2.02 (0.12)  -2.25 (0.21)  -2.16 (0.02)  -2.33 (0.14)  -2.48 (0.21)  -2.16 (0.29)  Outside Job Offers 
Probability   Tenure (<12)  0.43 (0.00)  0.70 (0.11)  0.59 (0.04)  0.73 (0.04)  0.67 (0.11)  0.56 (0.18) 
Inside Job Offers 
Probability 
Constant term  -1.75 (0.01)  -1.67 (0.01)  -1.67 (0.03)  -1.81 (0.03)  -1.78 (0.03)  -1.74 (0.01) 
Constant term  6.66 (0.02)  6.86 (0.40)   7.11 (0.01)  6.90 (0.29)  6.96 (0.40)   6.98 (0.51) 
Tenure (<24)  0.08 (0.00)  0.01 (0.03)  0.18 (0.01)  0.13 (0.00)  -0.09 (0.01)  -0.06 (0.07) 
Tenure (24-48)  0.04 (0.00)  -0.20 (0.03)  0.09 (0.02)  0.05 (0.01)  -0.10 (0.02)  0.06 (0.00) 
Wage Offers (Unemployed) 
Age (20-30)  0.01 (0.01)  -0.01 (0.02)  -0.27 (0.00)  0.05 (0.01)  0.14 (0.02)  0.13 (0.04) 
 Age  (30-45)  0.08 (0.00)  0.10 (0.01)  -0.02 (0.00)  0.14 (0.00)  0.16 (0.01)  0.17 (0.00) 
 Unemp.  Exp.  -0.00 (0.00)  0.03 (0.01)  -0.04 (0.00)  -0.13 (0.00)   -0.01 (0.00)  -0.09 (0.00) 
Constant term  6.74 (0.02)  7.09 (0.22)  7.35 (0.01)  7.09 (0.20)  7.35 (0.22)  7.38 (0.37) 
Tenure (<24)  0.26 (0.01)  0.11 (0.00)  0.22 (0.01)  0.16 (0.04)  -0.03 (0.03)  -0.07 (0.15)  
Tenure (24-48)  0.25 (0.02)  0.07 (0.00)  0.21 (0.02)  0.46 (0.04)  0.12 (0.02)  0.16 (0.03) 
Wage Offer (Outside offer) 
Age (20-30)  0.03 (0.02)  -0.15 (0.00)  -0.35 (0.00)  -0.05 (0.00)   0.13 (0.00)  -0.19 (0.04) 
 Age  (30-45)  0.09 (0.00)  -0.03 (0.00)  -0.08 (0.00)  0.08 (0.00)  0.08 (0.00)  0.15 (0.00) 
Constant term  2.08  (0.07)  0.90 (0.13)  0.71 (0.08)  1.51 (0.10)  1.57 (0.13)  0.48 (0.00) 
Wage   0.73 (0.01)  0.89 (0.01)  0.93 (0.01)  0.81 (0.01)  0.80 (0.01)  0.95 (0.01) 
Tenure (<24)  -0.39 (0.01)  -0.30 (0.01)  -0.21 (0.02)  -0.13 (0.00)  -0.15 (0.01)  -0.03 (0.00) 
Wage Offer (Inside Offer) 
Tenure (24-48)  -0.09 (0.00)  -0.09 (0.00)  -0.08 (0.01)  -0.04 (0.01)  -0.05 (0.00)  0.01 (0.01) 
 Tenure  (48-60)  -0.05 (0.00)  0.02 (0.00)  -0.10 (0.00)  0.04 (0.02)  -0.02 (0.00)  -0.01 (0.00) 
 Age  (20-30)  -0.08 (0.00)  -0.08 (0.00)  -0.10 (0.00)  -0.06 (0.00)  -0.03 (0.00)  -0.04 (0.00) 
 Age  (30-45)  -0.03 (0.00)  -0.02 (0.00)  -0.02 (0.00)  -0.02 (0.00)  0.01 (0.00)  -0.01 (0.00) 
Constant term  7.40 (0.02)  7.65 (0.02)  7.87 (0.02)  7.59 (0.03)  7.69 (0.01)  7.98 (0.01) 
Tenure (<12)  -0.22 (0.08)  -0.27 (0.04)  -0.22 (0.09)  -0.03 (0.03)  -0.13 (0.01)  -0.31 (0.01) 
Tenure (12-24)  -0.20 (0.03)  -0.25 (0.02)  -0.14 (0.03)  -0.10 (0.02)  -0.11 (0.03)  -0.08 (0.03)  
Tenure (24-48)  -0.19 (0.04)  -0.24 (0.02)  -0.10 (0.02)  -0.03 (0.02)  -0.10 (0.01)  -0.10 (0.02) 
Tenure (48-60)  -0.18 (0.05)  -0.18 (0.4)  0.03 (0.03)  0.02 (0.02)  -0.11 (0.01)  -0.09 (0.03) 
Age (20-30)  -0.08 (0.01)  -0.26 (0.01)  -0.49 (0.01)  -0.06 (0.01)  -0.02 (0.03)  -0.16 (0.02) 
Previous Wage
* 
Age (30-45)  -0.05 (0.02)  -0.15 (0.01)  -0.21 (0.01)  0.04 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01) 
 Civil  status  -0.07 (0.00)  -0.08 (0.00)  -0.11 (0.00)  -0.07 (0.00)  -0.05 (0.00)  -0.06 (0.00) 
Variance (Wage Offer Unemployed)  0.16 (0.00)  0.11 (0.00)  0.15 (0.00)   0.17 (0.00)  0.15 (0.00)  0.24 (0.00) 
Variance (Outside Wage Offer)  0.11 (0.00)  0.10 (0.00)  0.12 (0.00)  0.09 (0.00)  0.08 (0.00)  0.31 (0.00) 
Variance (Inside Wage Offer)  0.03 (0.00)  0.02 (0.00)  0.02 (0.00)  0.02 (0.00)  0.03 (0.00)  0.02 (0.00) 
Variance (Measurement Error)  0.04 (0.00)  0.02 (0.00)  0.02 (0.00)  0.03 (0.00)  0.03 (0.00)  0.01 (0.00) 
Variance (Previous Wage)  0.10 (0.00)  0.12 (0.00)  0.13 (0.00)  0.09 (0.00)  0.09 (0.00)  0.13 (0.00) 
Variance (Reservation Wage)  0.10 (0.00)  0.16 (0.00)  0.13 (0.00)  0.09 (0.00)  0.08 (0.00)  0.14 (0.00) 
e
-π  0.71 (0.00)  0.61(0.00)  0.81 (0.00)  0.69 (0.00)  0.72 (0.00)  0.55 (0.00) 
ρ (Unemployed)  0.80 (0.00)  0.86 (0.00)  0.91 (0.00)  0.85 (0.00)  0.82 (0.00)  0.92 (0.00) 
Likelihood Function  1.11372 1.10353 1.05741 0.87543 0.91870  0.94597 
* Previous wage also contains time dummy variables.  








6  Table 6 (cont.): Model’s Parameters, France and Portugal 
   France  Portugal 
Level of Studies    Primary   Secondary   Tertiary  Primary   Secondary    
Constant term
  -0.18 (0.01)  -0.03 (0.01)  0.07 (0.00)  -0.11 (0.00)  -0.02 (0.01)    Value of time while 
unemployed Tenure,  (<12)  -0.07 (0.01)    -0.18 (0.01)  -0.08 (0.00)    -0.11 (0.00)  -0.03 (0.01)   
 Age  (20-30)  -0.10 (0.04)  -0.27 (0.01)  -0.11 (0.00) -0.08  (0.00) -0.06  (0.00)  
 Age  (30-45)  0.01 (0.01)  0.02 (0.00)  -0.01 (0.00) -0.07  (0.00) -0.03  (0.00)  
Constant term  -1.13 (0.20)  -1.08 (0.20)  -0.84 (0.01) -1.38  (0.21) -1.55  (0.10)   Job Offers Probability 
(Unemployed)  Tenure (<12)  -0.15 (0.21)  -0.19 (0.01)  0.02 (0.01) 0.26  (0.01) 0.52  (0.10)   
Constant term  -2.21 (0.07)  -2.01 (0.21)  -1.51 (0.02) -1.96  (0.01) -2.09  (0.11)   Outside Job Offers Probability 
Tenure (<12)  0.99 (0.09)  0.67 (0.01)  0.45 (0.04) 0.65  (0.01) 0.63  (0.21)   
Intside Job Offers Probability Constant  term  -1.75 (0.01)  -1.65 (0.01)  -1.68 (0.03) -1.77  (0.00) -1.69  (0.03)  
Constant term  6.72 (0.11)  6.73 (0.14)   6.67 (0.01)  5.89 (0.02)  6.29 (0.40)    
Tenure (<24)  0.34 (0.09)  0.28 (0.00)  0.29 (0.01) 0.08  (0.02) 0.04  (0.03)   
Tenure (24-48)  0.02 (0.03)  0.03 (0.01)  0.07 (0.02)  0.06 (0.01)  -0.07 (0.02)   
Wage Offers (Unemployed) 
Age (20-30)  -0.13 (0.03)  0.18 (0.02)  0.12 (0.00)  0.04 (0.01)  -0.22 (0.02)   
 Age  (30-45)  0.08 (0.02)  -0.08 (0.01)  0.34 (0.00)  0.09 (0.00)  -0.24 (0.01)   
 Unemp.  Exp.  -0.06 (0.01)  -0.04 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01)  -0.04 (0.00)   -0.03 (0.00)   
Constant term  6.95 (0.06)  7.16 (0.22)  7.10 (0.01) 6.01  (0.20) 6.46  (0.21)   
Tenure (<24)  0.00 (0.05)  0.03 (0.01)  0.08 (0.01) 0.07  (0.04) 0.11  (0.03)   
Tenure (24-48)  0.20 (0.08)  0.07 (0.00)  -0.02 (0.02)  0.21 (0.04)  0.04 (0.02)   
Wage Offer (Outside offer) 
Age (20-30)  -0.07 (0.04)  -0.12 (0.00)  0.06 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)   -0.20 (0.00)   
 Age  (30-45)  0.20 (0.03)  -0.10 (0.00)  0.36 (0.00)  0.07 (0.00)  -0.22 (0.00)   
Constant term  0.73  (0.09)  0.26 (0.13)  0.36 (0.08) 1.16  (0.10) 0.65  (0.26)   
Wage   0.91 (0.01)  0.97 (0.01)  0.97 (0.01) 0.83  (0.01) 0.91  (0.01)   
Tenure (<24)  -0.14 (0.01)  -0.05 (0.01)  -0.10 (0.02) -0.08  (0.00) -0.16  (0.01)  
Wage Offer (Inside Offer) 
Tenure (24-48)  -0.04 (0.00)  -0.03 (0.00)  0.01 (0.01)  -0.05 (0.01)  -0.11 (0.00)   
 Tenure  (48-60)  -0.00 (0.02)  -0.03 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) -0.00  (0.02) 0.00  (0.00)  
 Age  (20-30)  -0.00 (0.01)  0.01 (0.00)  -0.01 (0.00) -0.05  (0.00) -0.01  (0.00)  
 Age  (30-45)  -0.01 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  -0.01 (0.00)  -0.02 (0.00)  0.03 (0.00)   
Constant term  7.62 (0.01)  7.94 (0.02)  8.16 (0.02) 6.61  (0.03) 7.07  (0.01)   
Tenure (<12)  -0.22 (0.02)  -0.26 (0.00)  -0.34 (0.12) -0.16  (0.03) -0.23  (0.01)  
Tenure (12-24)  -0.18 (0.02)  -0.24 (0.02)  -0.16 (0.02) -0.15  (0.02) -0.05  (0.03)  
Tenure (24-48)  -0.20 (0.04)  -0.19 (0.02)  -0.11 (0.02) -0.13  (0.02) -0.16  (0.01)  
Tenure (48-60)  -0.13 (0.05)  -0.17 (0.02)  -0.10 (0.03) -0.07  (0.02) -0.15  (0.01)  
Age (20-30)  -0.13 (0.01)  -0.22 (0.01)  -0.13 (0.01) -0.07  (0.01) -0.32  (0.03)  
Previous Wage
* 
Age (30-45)  -0.05 (0.02)  -0.10 (0.01)  -0.13 (0.01) -0.02  (0.01) -0.11  (0.01)  
 Civil  status  -0.08 (0.00)  -0.17 (0.00)  -0.28 (0.00) -0.12  (0.00) -0.04  (0.00)  
Variance (Wage Offer Unemployed)  0.20 (0.00)  0.19 (0.00)  0.19 (0.00)   0.21 (0.00)  0.23 (0.00)   
Variance (Outside Wage Offer)  0.12 (0.00)  0.14 (0.00)  0.16 (0.00) 0.12  (0.00) 0.24  (0.00)   
Variance (Inside Wage Offer)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 0.02  (0.00) 0.02  (0.00)   
Variance (Measurement Error)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 0.02  (0.00) 0.02  (0.00)   
Variance (Previous Wage)  0.09 (0.00)  0.09 (0.00)  0.12 (0.00) 0.12  (0.00) 0.12  (0.00)   
Variance (Reservation Wage)  0.20 (0.00)  0.15 (0.00)  0.12 (0.00) 0.13  (0.00) 0.15  (0.00)   
e
-π  0.64 (0.00)  0.58 (0.00)  0.61 (0.00)  0.70 (0.00)  0.71 (0.00)   
ρ (Unemployed)  0.99 (0.00)  0.99 (0.00)  0.99 (0.00)  0.91 (0.00)  0.80 (0.00)   
Likelihood Function (mean)  0.87688 1.01963 1.05741 0.83559 0.94063   
* Previous wage also contains time dummy variables.  








7  Table 7: Summary of Model’s Results by Country and Skill levels (Elasticities) 
Variable Description (unemployed)  Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary  Secondary Tertiary  Primary Secondary Tertiary 
  Reservation Wage  Accepted Wage  Acceptance Probability  Exit  probability 
Spain                    
Value of time while unemployed  0.91 1.12 1.91  0.54 0.57 0.97  -1.47  -1.35  -2.29  -1.47  -1.46  -1.99 
Job Offers Probability  (Unemployed)  0.42 0.5  0.5 0.24 0.21 0.22  -0.76  -0.64  -0.65  0.17 0.3  0.29 
Offer Wage (Unemployed)  0.31 0.44 0.46  0.16 0.15 0.18  0.57 0.49 0.53  0.57 0.5  0.56 
Outside Job Offers Probability   -0.16 -0.13 -0.13  -0.09 -0.06 -0.07  0.27 0.18 0.18  0.27 0.16  0.13 
Outside Offer Wage   -1.49 -1.88 -1.75  -1.27 -1.37 -1.32  0.88 1.06 0.96  0.88 1.08  1.00 
Inside Job Offers Probability  -0.9 -1.21 -1.23  -0.48 -0.43  -0.5 1.63  1.3  1.38  1.63 1.33  1.46 
Inside Offer Wage   -0.64 -0.83  -1.4  -0.39 -0.42 -0.73  1.03 1.12  1.7 1.03 1.04  1.39 
Germany       
Value of time while unemployed  1.33 0.92 3.07  0.86 0.64 2.15  -2.49  -2.41  -6.7  -2.96  -2.44  -6.09 
Job Offers Probability (Unemployed)  0.41 0.31 0.34  0.27 0.21 0.23  -0.91  -0.84  -0.84  0.00  0.07 0.05 
Offer Wage (Unemployed)  0.18 0.12 0.29  0.11 0.08 0.19  0.45 0.35 0.76  0.45  0.38 0.86 
Outside Job Offers Probability   -0.27 -0.22 -0.18  -0.18 -0.15 -0.13  0.59  0.6  0.32  0.59 0.57  0.24 
Outside Offer Wage   -1.58 -1.37 -1.25  -1.37 -1.26 -1.16  1.22 0.93 0.82  1.21 0.97  0.95 
Inside Job Offers Probability  -0.72 -0.38  -0.7  -0.44 -0.25 -0.48  1.77 1.09 1.77  1.75 1.22  2.01 
Inside Offer Wage   -1.27 -0.95  -2.6  -0.83 -0.65 -1.82  2.89 2.51 5.77  2.89 2.48  5.02 
France       
Value of time while unemployed  1.61 2.91 3.44  0.85 1.25 2.52  -2.04  1.87  -4.49  -2.38  -2.43  -4.40 
Job Offers Probability  (Unemployed)  0.64 0.78 0.40  0.33 0.25 0.25  -0.93  -0.58 -1.00  -0.02 0.36  -0.10 
Offer Wage (Unemployed)  0.41 0.46 0.42  0.18 0.11 0.25  0.56 0.27 1.09  0.54 0.27 1.09 
Outside Job Offers Probability   -0.31 -0.48 -0.09  -0.17 -0.17 -0.07  0.45 0.29 0.09  0.47 0.31 0.09 
Outside Offer Wage   -2.08 -2.11 -1.40  -1.56 -1.31 -1.22  1.45 0.84 1.55  1.41 0.82 1.56 
Inside Job Offers Probability  -1.42 -1.24 -1.32  -0.61 -0.31 -0.81  1.91 0.69 3.36  1.83 0.70 3.36 
Inside Offer Wage   -1.40 -2.65 -2.86  -0.77 -1.04 -2.14  2.09 1.87 3.07  2.16 2.23 2.98 
Portugal       
Value of time while unemployed  2.03  2.65 -  1.26  1.84 -  -3.41 -4.79  -  -3.21 -4.56  - 
Job Offers Probability  (Unemployed)  0.51  0.42 -  0.31  0.27 -  -0.94 -0.87  -  -0.06 0.02  - 
Offer Wage (Unemployed)  0.26  0.37 -  0.15  0.23 -  0.52 0.77  - 0.58 0.90  - 
Outside Job Offers Probability   -0.32 -0.14  -  -0.20 -0.09 -  0.56  0.28 -  0.52  0.18 - 
Outside Offer Wage   -1.67 -1.34  -  -1.40 -1.20 -  1.23  0.94 -  1.34  1.01 - 
Inside Job Offers Probability  -0.98 -1.03  -  -0.54 -0.64 -  1.96  2.07 -  2.17  2.41 - 











8  Table 8: Model Prediction Versus Observed Results: Unemployed Workers (average) 
 Primary  Education  Secondary  Education Tertiary  Education 
  Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted  Observed 
Spain         
Re-employment Wage   1130 1134  1226 1209 1512 1533 
Average Wage Change  -2.3%  -4.5  -2.8% -2.0% -0.8% -3.8% 
Share of Wage Losers  57% 51%  40% 48% 36% 50% 
Average Wage Loss  -12.9% -23.4%  -16.0% -22.1% -22.4% -25.2% 
Germany         
Re-employment Wage   1678 1656  1699 1795 1965 2058 
Average Wage Change  -11.3% -16.2%  -13.1% -10.6% -13.1% -10.6% 
Share of Wage Losers  78% 65%  65% 58% 73% 62% 
Average Wage Loss  -15.1% -29.9%  -14.6% -29.1% -19.5% -29.1% 
France         
Re-employment Wage   1491 1535  1637 1669 2101 2040 
Average Wage Change  1.9% 2.2% 1.4% 4.5%  17.9%  15.0% 
Share of Wage Losers  40% 42%  51% 45% 26% 36% 
Average Wage Loss  -19.8% -17.2%  -17.7% -18.0% -17.5% -21.8% 
Portugal         
Re-employment Wage   616 592 745 717     
Average Wage Change  -3.1% -6.7%  0.4%  0.0%     
Share of Wage Losers  50% 48% 47% 51%     









9  Table 9: Structural Parameters: Unemployed Workers (average) 
 Spain  Germany  France  Portugal 
Level of Studies  Primary  Secondary  Tertiary   Primary   Secondary   Tertiary  Primary   Secondary  Tertiary   Primary  Secondary    
Reservation Wage   789 832  981  1227 1281  1353 939  1079  1413  405  496   
Reservation Wage/Previous Wage  62.8% 64.9%  64.9%  62.8%  66.3% 59.5% 64.2%  66.8%  79.9% 64.6% 66.7%   
Value of time while unemployed   724 930  1352 1444 1447  2251 1188  1431  1767  514  657   
Value of time while unemployed/Previous 
Wage  69.9% 73.9%  88.8%  73.1%  74.8% 99.5% 81.2%  88.6%  99.8% 81.9% 88.5%   
Job Offers Probability   15.6%  11.3% 9.5% 16.9%  22.2%  15.0% 10.8%  12.5%  21.2% 10.4% 12.2%   
Offer Wage (Unemployed)  871 1008  1195  1076 1104 1137 1033  1054  1258  392  443   
Offer Wage (Unemployed)/Previous Wage  73.8% 82.9%  78.4%  54.4%  57.1% 50.4% 70.6%  61.4%  70.0% 62.4% 59.7%   
Acceptance Probability   68.2% 76.2%  69.8%  38.3%  40.8% 39.3% 58.1%  53.5%  44.7% 48.3% 45.2%   
Unemployment Exit   10.6% 8.5%  6.7%  6.5%  9.1%  5.9% 6.1%  7.2%  9.5% 5.2% 5.3%   
                       
Offer Wage (Outside Offer)/Offer Wage 
(Unemployed)  1.27 1.32  1.39  1.42  1.44 1.69  1.27 1.23 1.24  1.30  1.38   
Exit job-to-job with wage gains  2.59% 2.81%  2.78%  1.06%  1.02% 1.37% 3.42%  2.13%  6.26% 2.00% 2.24%   
Offer Wage (Inside Offer)/Offer Wage 
(Unemployed) 
0.92 0.93  1.01  1.18  1.17 1.19  1.01 1.02 1.01  1.07  0.98   
Exit on-the-job wage mobility  2.73% 2.45%  2.98%  3.27%  3.36% 3.93% 3.80%  4.29%  4.50% 3.64% 4.32%   
Exit job-to-job with wage losses  0.03% 0.02%  0.00%  0.01%  0.01% 0.00% 0.02%  0.02%  0.02% 0.01% 0.01%   
Exit employment to unemployment  1.06% 0.41%  0.16%  0.27%  0.37% 0.12% 0.20%  0.63%  0.15% 0.19% 0.20%   
Average Wage Loss (4 years of 
employment)*  -9.1% -3.6%  -2.7%  7.4%  3.2%  0.2%  9.0%  7.1%  18.4%  3.4%  3.8%  
Prob. of exiting to unemployment  (4 years 
of employment)  1.95% 1.38%  0.87%  0.54%  0.74% 0.24% 0.30%  1.44%  0.13% 0.44% 0.45%   









10  Table 10: Policy Evaluation: Unemployment Benefit System (by country and level of studies) 
   Spain Germany  France  Portugal 
   Primary Secondary  Tertiary    Primary Secondary   Tertiary   Primary  Secondary Tertiary Primary  Secondary   
Unemployment Exit 
probability 
8.3% 7.9%  6.7% 7.8% 9.1%  5.7% 6.1% 5.2%  7.8% 5.1% 4.9% 
Average Wage Change   -1.5% 0.8%  -0.9% -9.5% -7.9%  -9.7% -1.4% 7.5%  27.1%  -3.8% 6.4% 
Baseline Case 
(whole sample) 
Share of Wage Losers  48%  31% 37%  78%  65% 73%  45%  55% 26%  57%  44% 
Unemployment Exit 
probability  9.4% 8.9%  7.9% 8.3%  11.3% 10.6% 7.5%  6.8%  10.8% 6.6%  6.6% 
Average Wage Change   -11.9% -5.4%  -8.9% -11.0%  -12.9% -22.2% -9.5%  -4.4%  19.9% -15.0% -9.6% 
UI Benefits 
(decrease 10%) 
Share of Wage Losers  71%  45% 62%  86%  76% 83%  75%  59% 40%  66%  57% 
Unemployment Exit 
probability  6.6% 5.3%  7.6% 6.5% 7.9%  9.2% 2.1% 1.2%  7.4% 2.8% 4.5% 
Average Wage Change  1.5% 3.1%  -8.5%  -0.8%  -4.5% -16.7% 21.5% 27.5%  20.5% 13.8%  5.6% 
UI Benefits 
depend on the 
national average 




11  Table 11: Policy Evaluation: UI Benefits are eliminated when the worker rejects a job offer (by country and level of studies) 
   Spain Germany  France  Portugal 
   Primary Secondary University Primary Secondary    University Primary Secondary University Primary Secondary   
Unemployment Exit 
probability  4.3% 5.9%  2.9% 5.3% 6.4%  5.1% 4.1% 4.6%  4.1% 3.5% 3.5%  Baseline Case 
Average Wage Change   -2.7% -1.4%  -4.8%  -11.1%  -8.1% -10.7%  -7.7% -4.5%  34.1% 5.7% 23.6% 
Unemployment Exit 
probability 
6.1% 7.8%  4.1% 5.4% 6.4%  5.1% 4.8% 5.7%  5.5% 4.6% 3.7%  Policy variation 
Average Wage Change  -4.8% -3.1% -17.9%  -12.5%  -8.2% -10.7%  -10.8%  -39.7% 12.8% -6.1% 20.1% 
  